GILMAN v. RAILROAD CO.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Mlaine.
GILMAN v. EUROPEAN & NORTH AMERICAN R. R. COMPANY.
Where animals escape from their pasture, through defect of fences, which it is
the duty of a railway company to maintain, and thereafter come upon the track
and are killed by a passing train, the company will be held responsible to the
owner.
And the fact that the animals, after their first escape, wandered over other intervening land of their owner, and finally came upon the track across the land of
another landowner, and by reason of there being no fence between the track and
the river, which the company had omitted to build, by reason of a contract to that
effect with the owner of the land, will not excuse the company. The loss is sufficiently the natural result of the defendant's negligence, in omitting to build a
proper fence upon plaintiffs land, to render the defendant responsible.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion which was delivered by
BARROWS, J.-The plaintiff's land is bounded easterly by tlzb
Penobscot river, northerly by land of James Page, and southerly
by land of Samuel Page. The defendants' railroad intersects all
these lots where the land is improved. There was a line fence
between the plaintiff's land and James Page's, and a defective one
between plaintiff's and Samuel Page's, on the easterly or river side
of the railroad. Defendants had built their fence across the
plaintiff's land on both sides-across James Page's on the river or
easterly side, and across Samuel Page's on the westerly side of
their railroad; and in settling land-damages with Samuel Page
they had obtained a stipulation from him that they should not be
required to fence the easterly or river side of their road across his
land until notified by him, and at the time the plaintiff's ox vas
killed they had not been notified. But there was a defect in defendants' fence on plaintiff's land at the point where their fence
across James Page's land on the river side of the railroad com-menced, and through that defect the plaintiff's ox passed from his
pasture on to the railroad some five or six hours before he was
killed. Several weeks before this time the plaintiff's steers had
been injured on the railroad, and thereupon he built a fence across
his own land from James Page's line around and near the bank of
the river above high-water mark, continuing it on the boundary
between his own land and land of Samuel Page to the railroad,
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and thus effectually enclosing his pasture, except for the defect in
the defendants' fence above mentioned. The morning of the day
the ox was killed an employee of the defendants found the ox on
the railroad track, drove him from it into James Page's pasture
(erroneously supposing it to be the plaintiff's), and thence it
appeared that the ox had travelled around on the river bank across
his owner's land but outside of his pasture fence about seventy rods
to Samuel Page's land, which was unfenced along the line of the
railroad on that side in accordance with the stipulation above referred to; and so the ox went directly from Samuel Page's land
upon the track and was killed. The defendants claim to be relieved from paying for him by virtue of this agreement with Samuel
Page, inasmuch as he at last came on to the track from Samuel
Page's land. But the presiding judge instructed the jury that if
the ox escaped through the defendants' fence on his owner's land,
and by reason of a defect thtrein, the defendants would be liable,
notwithstanding the agreement between Samuel Page and the defendants, and notwithstanding the facts above stated as to the
whereabouts and wanderings of the ox after his escape from the
owner's pasture as aforesaid.
The defendants insist now that the ruling was erroneous, because
they say the ox came at last upon their track from S. Page's land,
and, whether he was there by consent of Page, or as a trespa-ser,
the owner cannot recover; and they cite cases in which it is held,
with more or less distinctness, that at common laNN every man must
at his own proper peril keop his cattle on his own land, and that
except by virtue of some agreement, prescription, or statute assignment or requirement, no one is bound to fence against 'anadjoining close, and that, when one is thus bound, it is only against the
cattle lawfully upon such close: that these principles have been
and should be applied to the (onstruction of statutes requiring
railroad companies to fence their roads where they pass through
enclosed or improved land-that those statutes do not affect or add
to the rights of those who have no interest in the ,djoining land,
nor the obligations of the railroad company to them; but those
rights and obligations still remain as at common law, and that any
contract with the adjoining proprietor as to the building or omitting to build the statute fence through his land is valid and binding
upon such proprietor, and relieves the company from any liability
for injury to his cattle or any cattle coming upon the track from
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his land to the extent of its provisions, unless such injury is inflicted by the wanton or careless mismanagement of their engines
and trains. Hereupon they argue that if the ox was on S. Page's
land with S. Page's consent, his owner can have no greater rights
against the company than Page himself would have had; that
Page could not recover in such a suit because of their agreement,
that they are not liable on account of the original escape, because
the ox afterwards went across his owner's land, and that the negligence of plaintiff in not fencing between his land and that of
Samuel Page on the river bank-not the defect in the defendants'
fence by which the animal first escaped-was the proximate cause
of the injury, or at least contributed to produce it..
But we think the defendants fail to bring their case within the
principles decided in the cases they cite, and behind which they
seek to intrench themselves, in more than one important particular.
1. If they would have us decide that the rulings of which they
complain militate against the cases which hold, as we have done in
Perkins v. Eastern B. R. Co., 29 Maine 310, that the railroad
company is not bound to fcnce against cattle wrongfully upon the
adjoining close, they should at the very least have made it appear
in their exceptions that there was testimony tending to show that
the plaintiff's ox had no right to pasture upon Samuel Page's land
there between the railroad and the river.
In the absence of any such statement, we infer that those dc(-isions were inapplicable to the facts in the present case. Were
there nothing else to found it on, the form of the defendants' argument would fairly justify the inference. Their position is, that if
the ox was on Page's land with his consent, the plaintiff is barred
from recovering, by reason of the agreement with Page that they
need not build the fence until notified by him, thus assuming the
fact with regard to Pag6's consent to be as the plaintiff claims it
was. But it was incumbent upon the excepting party to state
how the fact was if it were otherwise. We cannot presume a fact
which the case does not show in order to base upon it an argument
that there was error in the instructions.
2. The defendants -also cite cases in which it has been held that
where there is a contract with the adjoining proprietor that the
company shall not be required to build the fence across his land,
he cannot recover for injuries accruing from the want of such
fence. But the defendants had no such contract with this plaintiff.
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They claim that the same result follows as to all cattle lawfully
running upon Page's land. But we do not think that an agreement like this for the nullification of a statute of this state can be
regarded as having any effect upon the rights of any one who is
not a party to it, nor shown to be cognisant of or assenting to it.
The statute requirement is explicit, "Legal and sufficient fences
are to be made on each side of land taken for a railroad where it
passes through enclosed or improved land, or wood lots belonging
to a farm, before a construction of the road is commenced, and they
are to be maintained and kept in good repair by the corporation."
R. S. of 1857, c. 61, § 23: R. S. of 1871, c. 51, § 20. A penalty
is imposed for the breach of this law. An action lies in favor of
one who without fault on his own part has suffered damage by
reason of the defendant's disregard of the law. If they will
stipulate with adjoining proprietors to suffer them to break it, such
an agreement will not relieve them from any liability they may
thereby incur to any innocent third party. A covenant of that
description does not "run with the land." The statute provision
is an important one for the safety of the travelling public, the
railroad company itself, and the whole community. An agreement to disregard it will bar the rights of no one who is not culpably consenting to it. It follows that the ruling was right, even if
the want of the fence on S. Page's land is to be regarded as the
proximate cause of the injury.
3. But we think it is a refinement quite too subtle to relieve the
defendants from liability, when the ox escaped from the owner's
enclosure onto the track by reason of the defect in the defendants'
fence, to claim that this was not the proximate cause of the accident, because he was driven thence by a railroad employee into
another man's pasture, and strayed thence across his owner's land
outside of his enclosure upon the track again at the place where he
was killed. He escaped from the enclosure in -hich his owner
had placed him for safe-keeping, through the fault of the defendants. He was not restored by them to the custody of the
owner. That he was driven upon Page's land and returned again
upon the track after crossing unenclosed land belonging to his
owner, can make no difference as to the liability of the defendants.
If after thus escaping upon the track he had strayed through
other defects in the defendants' fences upon the lands of other adjoining proprietors, before he met his death upon the track, there
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would be no propriety in permitting the defendants to set up the
fact that he was unlawfully upon such neighbors' lands, because it
was through their fault and not the fault of the plaintiff that he
was there at all. They could not be thus permitted out of two
wrongs to make a right. The case bears no resemblance in its
facts to that of Eames v. S. & L. B. B. Co., 98 Mass. 561.
Neither is it one to which the maxim causa proxima, non remota
spectatur, can be usefully and properly applied. There would be
ust as much propriety in attributing the loss to the perversity of
the animal in remaining upon the track instead of moving aside
at the approach of the engine, as there would be in reckoning as
a proximate ca'use its wanderings after it had escaped from the
owner's enclosure through the fault of the defendants. Their neglect was the true efficient procuring cause, without which the
accident could not have happened.
4. The plaintiff does not appear to have been negligent in any
respect. It would seem that he had taken special care, after the
accident to his steers, and fenced his pasture against the river as
well as on the line between the pasture and Samuel Page's land,
so that his cattle would have been secure but for the defect in defendants' fence. It cannot be imputed to the plaintiff as negligence
that he did not fence between his land and the land of Samuel
Page on the river bank where his cattle were not allowed to run,
and where the ox could not have gone if the defendants had done
their duty.
None of the cases which have turned upon the question of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, present similar features or anything analogous.
We are satisfied that the instruction given by the presiding
judge directed the attention of the jury to the only question they
had to consider, and that the matters relied on by the defendants
afford them no legal defence to the-plaintiff's claim.
There seems to be no question of any
doubt in the foregoing case, except that
of the legal cause of injury or damage.
if the loss is to be regarded as the legal
consequence of the defect in the defendant's fence upon the plaintiff's land, by
reason of which the animal first escaped,
then the company must be held responsible. But if the loss was too remote a

consequence of defendant's negligence
to be regarded as coming within the
range of legal responsibility, the plaintiff cannot recover. The question of
remote and proximate causes has, of
late, been attempted to be applied to
legal questions by many writers and
judges. It seems to be supposed, by
some, that the maxim, Injure non remota
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causa, sed proxina, spectatur, possessed a
kind of talismanic power to open legal
mysteries. But if it does possess any
such power, it is certainly something of
juite modern discovery. Those who
have made it a study do not seem quite
agreed in regard to the origin of the
maxum. We have taken the above form
of it from a learned article in 4 Am.
Law Review, 201 by Mr. St. John
Green, a member of the Suffolk bar,
and possessing many promising characteristics as a law writer and lecturer.
It is there credited to Lord BAcoN's
We have
"Maxims of the Law."
not been able to find it among any
of the collections of maxims of the
English law which were at hand, and
specially not in Broom's Legal Maxims.
We have looked, with equal want of success, among some of the digests of the
Roman Civil Law. And Mr. Green
says: " An unsuccessful search for this
maxim has been made in the civil law."
It seems to be rather a philosophical or
logical maxim than a legal one. Mr.
Green traces its substance from Aristotle, through the schoolmen, to Lord
BAcon. His conclusion, although somewhat hesitatingly expressed, seems to be
that the maxim, as used by the logicians,
has no just application to the exposition
of the law. We must say that we had
come to the same conclusion long before
we received Mr. Green's article ; but,
of course, upon less investigation and
study. The subject has been largely
discussed, of late, upon both sides of the
Atlantic, in connection with a portion
of the American claims at Geneva, and
the general conclusion reached, that
damages, not the probable consequences
of negligence, cannot be regarded as
coming within the range of legal responsibility for such negligence. This is the
old-fashioned mode of stating this class
of questions in the English law ; and
it seems to us far less misleading and
more satisfactory than the new-fangled

learning about proximate and remote
causes. The proximate cause, in the
sense of the schoolmen, was the causa
causans, or the cause necessarily producing the result. In this sense the
collision between the defendant's locomotive and the plaintiff's ox was the
only proximate cause of the damage or
loss, and all the causes leading up to
that collision, upon both sides, were
remote causes. But the defendant is
attempted to be charged with responsibility for the loss upon the ground of
negligence. And it tends greatly to the
clear apprehension of the question, to
state it in the reverse order from that in
which we have been attempting to discuss it. Instead of seeking for the proximate and remote causes of the damage,
let us look at the near and natural consequences of the defendant's negligence
as compared with those which were reBy
mote, incidental or exceptional.
the well known and clearly settled rule of
the common law, the defendant was only
responsible for the former and not for
the latter.
In this view we think it can scarcely
be questioned, that the negligence of
the defendant in leaving the fence out
of repair might naturally have been expected to result in the plaintiff's cattle
coming at large and upon the track of
defendant's railway, and being there
killed by passing trains. This, instead of being an unusual and accidental, or unexpected result, was the ordinary and every-day consequence of such
negligence. It is the precise and the
only consequence which would first come
to the mind of any one experienced in
such matters. But if the animal, in
fleeing from the engine, had become so
infuriated as to run over and kill the
plaintiff, or his child, it might be fairly
regarded, probably, as too remote a consequence of the negligence to form the
basis of a recovery. And so too, if in
consequence of the loss of his ox, the
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plaintiff had failed to perform some engagement, and, by reason of such default,
had been driven into bankruptcy, and
thus lost all his property and business,
no one would dream of making the defendant responsible for the loss. We
should be loth to believe, if history did
not afford authentic evidence of the
fact, that learned counsellors would be
able to present such a claim before any
court with a grave face. Even less remote consequences than those before
stated, by way of special damages, such
as the failure to harvest crops, in consequence of the loss of the animal, could
not be recovered.
See opinions of
SIAW, Ch. J., and THOMtAS, J., dissenting in Hfarble v. City of Worcester,
4 Gray 395, where this question is
learnedly and ably discussed.
But we cannot comprehend why the
plaintiff's ox, having wandered across a

portion of plaintiff's land, and thus
finally come upon the railway across
another man's land, through defect of
fence, which it was not the defendant's
duty to maintain, can relieve him from
the consequences of his first neglect.
If it had been through the plaintiff's
negligence that the animal had finally
come upon the track, it might have made
a case of contributory negligence, which
would preclude a recovery. But when
the destruction of the animal was the
natural consequence of the defendant's
negligence, and nothing interyened to
give any new cause of action or any new
ground of defence, but the impetus of
the original negligence continued without interruption, and in its natural
course, to the moment of injury, we
must conclude there is no just ground
of escape on the part of the defendants
I. F. R.

United States Circuit Court, District of Iowa. In Admiralty.
N. W. PACKET COMPANY v. ATLEE.
The District Court as a court of admiralty has jurisdiction of a cause wherei,
the libellant seeks to recover damages caused to his vessel by a pier erected by
the respondent without'legal authority within the navigable channel of the Mississippi river.
A riparian proprietor on the Mississippi, although he be the owner of a sawmill thereon, has no right, without legislative authority, to erect a solid pier of
masonry within the navigable channel of the river, in order to fasten thereto a
boom for the protection of.logs ; and such a pier comes within the legal notion
of a nuisance.
The respondent held to be in fault for failing to keep such a pier lighted at
night, in consequence of which the libellant's vessel was sunk and her cargo
inj-;red.
Extent of riparian rights on the Mississippi river considered.

THE packet company filed a libel in admiralty in the District
Court, against the respondent, Atlee, to recover damages for injuries to the barge Reaney and cargo, by reason of its running

against a pier placed in the Mississippi river by the respondent.
The accident happened about 11 o'clock on the night of the 2,9d
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day of April 1871. The steamboat Sheridan, with the barge
Reaney in tow, lashed to her starboard side, was descending the
river from St. Paul to St. Louis, this being her first trip during
that season, and struck the upper pier of the respondent. The
night was dark and there was no light upon the pier at the time.
The respondent was proprietor of a tract of land on the Mississippi river, on which he had built saw-mills, and had for some
years moored his rafts of lumber in the river opposite his land
until the logs were sawed, and these rafts frequently extended further into the river than the pier in question. In the winter of
1870-71, respondent built a boom several hundred feet lcng, and
protected it by two piers built in the river. Whether the pier in
question, the upper one, was in the channel or not was a point in
dispute. The following facts appeared to be established: The pier
is 29 feet by 22 in size, and about 25 high from the bed of the
river, rising a few feet above the surface of the water. It is from
100 to 150 feet from the bank, according to the stage of the
water. The water is about 12 feet deep along the outside of the
pier at a low stage of the river ; at the time of the collision the
water was about 20 feet deep at the pier. About 600 or 700
feet above is a bar, or delta from a creek, which projects into the
river about 300 feet, from which point the bank of the river recedes, so that the complainant's land on the bank is about 200 feet
in from where a straight line drawn from the point of the delta to
the shore below would come.
Outside of this pier there is a free passage-way for boats several
hundred feet in width. The pilot of the Sheridan was skilful and
competent, and fully acquainted with the river, but he had no
knowledge of the existence of the pier. He was employed as a
pilot during the whole of 1869 on the upper Mississippi, but not
in 1870. The pier was constructed in the winter of 1870-1, and
the Sheridan at the time of the collision was making her first trip
for the season. Ile did not keep the boat to the middle of the
channel, but ran or allowed the boat to run where the pier stood.
The barge struck the upper outside of the pier (which projected
above the water only a few feet) and sank almost immediately.
After the collision the respondent kept lights burning upon the
piers. The water is deep enough even in a low stage to allow
steamboats to pass inside the piers erected by the respondent, and
the testimony of more than a dozen pilots was to the effeci
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before the erection of the piers they had often run their vessels
over and about the plane where these piers stand.
The District Court decided that both parties were in fault-the
respondent for failing to keep lights on the pier, and the boat for
not keeping more in the middle of the stream-and divided the
damages in accordance with the admiralty rule. The total damages
reported by the commissioner were $2147.86, and from the
decree confirming this report the libellants appeal.
Howell & B ice and

. H. Davidson, for the libellants.

Mcarary, Yiller & McCrary, for the respondent.
DiLL , Circuit J.-The jurisdiction of the District Court in
admiralty of the case made by the libel, is settled by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and need not be further noticed: 23
How. 209.
The right of the respondent to erect and maintain these piers
at the place and under the circumstances stated, presents the
main question in the case, and it is a question of great importance.
The court may properly take notice that a large portion of all
the pine lumber which is supplied from the pine regions of Wisconsin and Minnesota is floated down the Mississippi in log-rafts,
which are owned by or sold to owners of mills located upon the
banks of the river. It is the almost invariable practice of the
mill-owner to moor the logs in the stream in front of or near his
mill, and the logs, in general, remain in the stream until they are
taken therefrom, one by one, into the mill to be sawed.
The more effectually to secure or protect his logs, the respondent built the piers and boom in question. It is conceded that
there is no statute of Congress or of the state authorizing the
erection. Its rightfulness depends, therefore, upon the general
principles of law.
The respondent claims the right as riparian proprietor, and it
fbllows of course that if he has the right, every other like proprietor has the same right.
Notwithstanding the able argument contained in the opinion of
his honor in the court below, I have not been able to reach the
conclusion that the right claimed for the respondent exists; and
although on a question of this kind, which he has so thoroughly

N. W. PACKET CO. v. ATLEE.

considered, I may well distrust the correctness of my own views,
still it is my duty to decide it according to my own judgment. It
is not my purpose to enter upon any extended argument against
the right which is set up by respondent, but only to indicate briefly
the grounds of my opinion.
The paramount right attaching to the Mississippi river is the
right to its free and unobstructed navigation. This is a public
right. It exists in favor of the whole public, and for all vessels,
small as well as large, and for rafts equally with boats. Any erection or obstruction not authorized by competent legislative enactment, which materially interferes with the paramount right of
navigation is unlawful, and comes within the legal notion of a
nuisance. The analogy between the river and a highway or street
as respects public rights is very close. The river is a highway or
waterway for the use of the public, just the same as a street or
highway; and individuals, for their own convenience, have no
more right, without legislative authority, to obstruct the one than
they have to encumber or obstruct the other. Their rights in
both cases are confined to a reasonable use of that which is common to all, and which may not be exclusively appropriated by any.
Telegraph poles, or gas-posts, or market-houses in the public
streets, are or may be convenient and useful not only to individuals
but the public, but if put there without legislative sanction, they
are in law nuisances. And so with any unauthorized individual
appropriation of any part of a street. Much more clearly would
the law pronounce illegal any exclusive appropriation of a portion
of the public way by individuals for their own convenience by
erections or acts which would or might endanger the safety of the
public.
The same principles apply to the rights of the public in the
river. The adjacent owner may make a reasonable use of the
river and the banks. He may, doubtless, land his rafts and fasten
them to the bank in front of his property. How long he might
keep his logs stationary in the water we need not inquire, for the
injury to the libellant's vessel was not caused by coming in contact with logs thus moored by the riparian proprietor; but by piers
of solid masonry built at a point which the evidence establishes to
be within the navigable channel of the river, even at its lowest
stage. No individual can of his own motion, and for his own advantage, abridge or infringe the rights of the public in respect to
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the navigation of the river.
A pier built within the navigable
channel, that is, at a point in the river where vessels may go, and
where they have a right to go, is an unlawful structure in the eye
of the law. Indeed, any permanent structure which interferes
with, or which may endanger or obstruct navigation is unlawful,
and cannot be legalized by any considerations of utility or otherwise, except by direct legislative authority.
Accordingly, it has been held that the erection and maintenance
without legislative permission of a dam in the Wisconsin river, at a
place where it is navigable in fact, is unlawful whether it does or
does not interfere with the navigation of the river: W. Imp. Co.
v. Lyons, 30 or 31 Wis.
It is suggested that there is an analogy between piers like those
erected by the respondent and bridges across navigable streams.
But though bridges across such streams may be of great private
convenience and public utility, still legiglative sanction is necessary
to legalize their existence.
Again, it is argued that the right of the respondent to build
and maintain the piers in question, rests, or may be rested, upon
the same grounds upon which the right of the riparian proprietor
to erect wharves and landing-places for his own or the public use.
Structures of the character just named, connected .with the shore,
when not erected in violation of legislative regulations, when they
do not obstruct the parampunt right of navigation, and are not
nuisances in fact, have the sanction of long usage in this country,
and under the qualifications suggested may be lawfully erected;
but the right, it is said, must be understood as terminating at the
point of navigability: IDutton v. Strong, 1 Black 23, 82; Yates
v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497.
The reason why wharves and landing-places are thus sanctioned
is that they are aids to navigation, and necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the respective rights of the public and the riparian proprietor. But the right to erect piers in the navigable
channel in order to construct a boom for the protection and detention of logs until the riparian proprietor may manufacture them,
rests upon no such usage; nor can such be justly said to be aids
to navigation, which it is to be remembered is the paramount right,
not in the least to be infringed without legislative sanction.
If the piers in question be considered unlawful the liability of
the defendant is clear. The pilot of the libellant's boat had no
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knowledge of the piers, and there was no light upon them to warn
him of their existence. In my judgment he is not to be held in
fault for not knowing that there was an unlawful obstruction in
the river and steering further out in the stream. Undoubtedly
if he had known of the pier, and if it had been lighted so tha
he could have seen its location, it would have been his duty, if
practicable, to have kept his boat away from it. In my opinion
the fault lies wholly with the respondent. This is clearly so if
the pier on which the boat was injured was not lawfully there. But
suppose I am in error in the above view, I still think the fault is with
the respondent, because of the failure to have lights upon it. The
river was high, it was at a season of the year when usually there
were no rafts moored in the stream, and it was not unlikely that
boats might run against it. I cannot think the pilot is in fault
under the circumstances for not having kept farther out in the stream.
So that, in any view of the case, I consider the respondent liable
for all the damages.
It is suggested that these views will occasion alarm to millowners upon the Mississippi. But I perceive no cause for apprehension.
If it should be deemed of sufficient importance, Congress would
doubtless concede all necessary rights and regulate the mode of
their enjoyment. This may perhaps be also done by the state in
the absence of action by Congress. But without such legislative
action it is not probable that mill-owners will be disturbed in the
exercise of their accustomed privileges, so long as they are reasonably
enjoyed and do not essentially interfere with or endanger the paramount right of a navigator.
The decree below will be reversed, and a decree entered here for
the appellant against the defendant for the $2147.86 reported by
the commissioners

United States Circuit Court, -Eastern Circuit of Aissouri.
CARRIE HOLABIRD v. ATLANTIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY.
Marriage, by the law of Missouri, is a civil contract, and no special ceremony is
essential to its validity; and the same law prevails in Illinois and Tennessee.
Although at the time of the marriage ceremony, the pretended hI sband had a
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wife living, so that the marriage was void, yet if after the death of his former
wife the parties agreed by mutual present consent, given in good faith, to become
husband and wife, and cohabited as such thereafter, then from the date of such
consent there was a valid marriage, and the wifewould have an, insurable interest
in the life of the husband, and could maintain an action upon a policy upon his
life. And the jury may find the fact of such subsequent marriage from the evidence of cohabitation, and reputation as man and wife.

Tnis was an action upon a policy of life insurance, taken out
in 1868 by the plaintiff, insuring to her the sum of $10,000 upon
the death of the husband, Oscar F. Holabird. The defences were,
that the plaintiff was not the wife of 0. F. Holabird at the time
of obtaining the policy, and therefore had no insurable interest,
and misrepresentations in the application.
The testimony showed that 0. F. Holabird and the plaintiff
were married at'St. Joseph, Mo., in 1861, by a clergyman. The
defendants' evidence tended to show that at that time 0. F. Holabird had a wife living, who died in Vermont in November 1863.
The piaintiff's rebutting evidence tended to show, that after that
date tha parties cohabited as man and wife in the states of Missouri,
Illinois and Tennessee; that he introduced the plaintiff to his
friends as his wife; called her his wife down to the time of his
death ii,1869.

charged the jury as follows:Under the issues in this case the plaintiff must prove that at the
date of the policy sued on she was the lawful wife of 0. F. Holabird, the person on whose life the risk was taken. If at the time
of the marriage ceremony, in May 1861, testified to by plaintiff,
the said 0. F. Holabird had a wife living, then said alleged
marriage with the plaintiff was void, and the plaintiff could not be
or become the lawful wife of said 0. F. Holabird during the lifetime of his former wife.
By the'statutes of Missouri marriage is declared to be "a civil
contract, to which the consent of the parties capable in law of contracting is essential." If subsequent to the death of the former
wife, assuming there were one, Mr. Holabird and plaintiff (being
over twenty-one years of age) were married, and that marriage was
prior to the date of the policy, and they continued to live together
as husband and wife until the policy was issued, then she, as his
wife, bad an insurable interest in his life. It is not necessary to
the validity of a marriage in Missouri that any special ceremony,
religious or otherwise, should be performed; nor that the marriage
TREAT, J.,
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shouild be solemnized before any person belonging to any one of
the classes named in the Missouri statute as authorized to perform
the ceremony. Marriage in Missouri may be had by the mutual
present consent of two competent persons, made in good faith and
followed by cohabitation, without the addition of any prescribed
formalities; and may be shown by such evidence as proves that
such a marriage actually exists. And such is substantially the
law in Tennessee and Illinois, so far as the same affects this case.
Therefore, should the jury believe from the evidence that at the
date of the marriage ceremony with the plaintiff, in May 1861,
Mr. Holabird had another wife living, yet should they further
believe from the evidence that such former wife died in 1863, and
if they further believe from the evidence that afterwards, in the
state of Missouri, Tennessee or Illinois, the plaintiff and Mr
Holabird agreed by mutual present consent, given in good faith.
to become husband and wife, and cohabited as such thereafter,
then from the date of said mutual consent she was his wife.
The attention of the jury is directed to the difference between a
mere attempted recognition of a past void marriage and a subsequent expression of mutual and then present consent to be huqband and wife. The subsequent marriage may be proved by habit
and repute, if the evidence thereof satis~es the jury that the parties
had mutually agreed to become husband and wife in good faith,
and cohabited thereafter as such.
If, at the date of the marriage ceremony between 0. F. Holabird and the plaintiff, in May 1861, said 0. F. Holabird did not
leave another wife living, then the plaintiff became his lawful wife
at that time.
The defendant seeks to avoid the policy by showing that those
declarations contained in the application, which are specified in
the answer filed in this case, were, or some one of them was, in
some respect, untrue at the time when made. By the terms of the
contract, if any one of the said declarations is found to have been
in any respect untrue at the time when made, then the plaintiff
cannot recover. It is immaterial whether, if untrue, those declarations were not intentionally untrue, or whether the matter inquired into, had it been otherwise answered, would have caused
,fhe risk to be considered more hazardous, or whether the disease
denied contributed to the death. Contracts like that sued on are
based for their validity upon the truthfulness of the declarations
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made by the applicant in the written application to the company.
As the declarations are presumed to be true, the burthen of proving them untrue is upon the defendant who controverts them.
Whether the representations were material to the risk or not, is
not open for inquiry in this case; for the defendant and plaintiff
agreed, as it was competent for them to do, that if any of the
declarations were in any respect untrue, the policy should be void.
Hence, it is for the jury to determine, from the evidence, whther
the defendant has shown any one of the declarations to have been
untrue in any respect, when made, and also whether the plaintiff
has shown that, at the date of the policy, she was the lawful wife
of the said 0. F. Holabird.
The jury should pass upon this case with impartiality and free
from all prejudice for or against either of the parties to the suit.
The rights of corporations and of natural persons are to be decided by the same rules of justice, and should be affected by no
considerations, except such as the law and evidence require when
controversies arise between them for judicial investigation.
If the jury find for the plaintiff, they will assess her damages
at $10,000, deducting therefrom the amount of notes for premiums
on the policy unpaid at the time of Mr. Holabird's death, together
with any balance of the year's premium remaining unpaid, and
will add interest on said sum, at the rate of six per cent. per year,
from the time proof of death was submitted to the defendant to
the present time.
If the jury find for the plaintiff, and are further satisfied from
the evidence that the defendant has vexatiously refused to pay the
loss in this case, they are at liberty, in their discretion, to add to
the foregoing sum an amount not exceeding ten per centum of the
loss. The law commits the question of vexatious refusal to the
calm and deliberate consideration of the jury, to be determined in
the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case.

United States Circuit Court, NZorthern Dvistrict of Tllinois.
JOHN GAUGHAN v. THE NORTH WESTERN FEITILIZING COMPANY.
The act of April 20th 1871, does not authorize the removal of a case from the
state courts in every case in which the United States courts would have original
jurisdiction.
Congress did not intend by the general words used to extend jurisdiction to re
'rove, except under the circumstances specified in the act.
VOL. XXI.-37
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IN 1867, the legislature of Illinois granted to parties the right
to manufacture a fertilizer out of the offal of animals slaughtered
in the city of Chicago. The act created a corporation, and authorized the location of the place of manufacture. Under this act of
incorporation, the parties went on and constructed works, and cnmmenced the manufacture of the fertilizer. The place at the time
was not within the limits of the town of Hyde Park; afterwards
it was included within its corporate limits, and this action was
commenced in the state court on 'the ground that the works were a
nuisance and an injury to'plaintiff's property. Before that, an
action was brought in this court by the present defendants against
the town of Hyde Park, the allegation being that the town, by
ordinances, had interfered with the chartered rights of the company under this act of the legislature.
Hitchcock, Dupee & .Evarts, for complainants.
Bentley, Swett ,+ Quigg, for defendants.
DRUMMOND, J.-There were two questions presented in the
argument. One was whether this court had the right to maintain
the bill filed here by the corporation called the Northwestern
Fertilizing Company. The views of the court were presented
upon that question the other day, and I was inclined to hold that,
under the first section of the act of the 20th April 1871, the
court had original jurisdiction of the case, on the ground that there
was a right claimed by the corporation land secured to it under the
Constitution of the United States, and there was an attempt on
the part of the town of Hyde Park to interfere with a right thus
claimed and protected. The other question, whether the company
had the, right to transfer the case pending in the state court to this
court under the certiorari that was issued, was argued yesterday,
and that question I will proceed to answer at this time. After the
best consideration I have been able to:gIve the subject, I am not
satisfied that the court has jurisdiction in that case. I am not clear
about it, and I think in all such-cases the -court ought not to take
jurisdiction unless itappears -clear. The ground upon which it is
claimed that the case can be transferred fiom the state to the federal court is certainly a plausible one. It is this: That the first
secti~u4 the act of April 20th 1871, declares "that such proceedings were to be prosecuted in the several District or Circuit
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Courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights
cf appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in
like cases in such court ;" and the provisions of the act of the 9th
of April 1866, entitled "1An act to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means for
their vindication, and the other remedial laws of the United States,
which are in their nature applicable in such cases." Now, the position on the part of the counsel, who claim that the court has jurisdiction to remove this case by certiorari,is, as I understand it (and
ft comes to that), that, wherever the court has original jurisdiction,
it can transfer a case from the state to the federal court under
this language: "Other remedies provided in like cases in such
courts, and the other remedial laws of the United States which are
in their nature applicable in such cases." If that is the true construction of this statute, then, of course, the court would have
jurisdiction to issue a certiorari and to take cognisance of the
case. But I am not satisfied that that is the true construction, and
it seems to me it would be going further than any court has yet
gone to construe such general language as this is so as to include
within its scope every case where a question would arise under the
Constitution of the United States. As was stated the other day,
numerous questions have arisen affecting rights- under the Constitution of the United States, where parties seeking their remedy
have been obliged to seek it through the forum of the state courts,
and so on up to the Supreme Court of the United States, under
the 25th section of the act of 1789, and other legislation since.
It is necessary, of course, to consider what these previous statutes are: "other remedies provided in like cases." It refers particularly to the act of 1866. That act refers to the act of 1863.
It is under the acts of 1833, 1868, 1866 and 1871, as I understand, that the claim is set up, that a fair construction of this act
of the 20th of April 1871, is to include within its scope all the
cases, so as to authorize a transfer where it gives original jurisdiction to the District or the Circuit Court. While the argument is
not without force, I cannot yield my conviction entirely to it. I
will state very briefly some reasons why I cannot do so. If we
look to the legislation of Congress in relation to the cases which
might be removed from the state to the federal courts, we see
that, in all cases where a removal has been authorized, the circumstances under which it is to take place are specifically set forth.
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It is so under the act of 1883, the language of the 2d section of
which is: "The jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United
States shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under
the revenue laws of the United States, for which other provisions
Sweeping in its terms, " all
are not already made by law."
cases." But the 3d section declares under what particular circumstances a case was to be removed from the state to the federal
court: "In any case where suit or prosecution shall be commenced
in a court of any state against any officer or other person for or
on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United
States, or under color thereof, for or on account of any right,
authority or title set up or claimed by such officer, it shall be lawful for the," &c.,-setting up in precise language under what circumstances the case was to be removed. And the 3d section is
substantially copied into the 16th section of the act of 1871,
which was referred to, mutatis mutandis, simply changing the
words in some particular instances.
The language of the 16th section of the act of February 28th
1871, is: "In any case where suit orprosecution, civil or criminal,
shall be commenced in a court of any state against any officer of
the United States, or other person, for or on account of any
acet done under the provisions of this act, or under color thereof,
or for or on account of any right, authority or title set up or claimed
by such officer or other person under any of said provisions, it
shall be lawful to transfer,"--setting up just as the act of 1833
set up, specifically, the circumstances under which the transfer
could be made. The 5th section of the act of 1862 is also specific: "If any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or
shall be commenced in any state court, against any officer, civil or
military, or against any arrest or imprisonment made, or other
trespass or wrongs done or committed, or any act omitted to be
done at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue of, or under color or authority, or direction from and exercised by or under
the President of the United States, or of any act of Congress, he
shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such court," and
so on, "have the right to transfer the case"--showing particularity
in describing the circumstances under which it can be transferred.
Tae 1st section of the act of 1866 declares that "all persons
born in the United States and not subjected to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of
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the United States, and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the parties
shall hav been duly convicted, shall have the same right in
every state and territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued, to give evidence," &c. The
1st section declares that if certain circumstances occur where
rights are affected by a proceeding in a state court, that then the
party shall have the right to transfer the case to the federal court.
The language of the 3d section is quite peculiar: "That the
District Courts of the United States, within their respective districts, shall have, exclusive of the courts of the several states, cognisaifce of all crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal,
has been or shall be commenced in any state court against any
such person for any cause whatsoever." Here is language more
general than in any other statute, either before or after, "against
any such person for any cause whatsoever."
Now it could not be maintained that by this act of Congress
every person whose rights were affected could transfer a case from
the state to the federal court, because the language of the 1st
section includes "all persons born in the United States." It could
not have been the intention of this section to give the federal
courts jurisdiction of rights affecting any and all persons who
were born in the United States. Certainly; but it means, I apprehend, the persons referred to in the previous part of the section-affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the
courts or judicial tribunals of the state or locality where they may
be, any rights secured to them by the 1st section of this act. "1If
any such suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been, or shall
be, commenced against any such person, for any cause whatsoever,"-it must mean the persons who cannot have their rights
enforced in the judicial tribunals of the-state; and the section proceeds in the usual way in which all these laws do: "or against
any officer, civil or military, or any person for any arrest, or imprisonment, or trespass or wrongs done," &c., "he shall have the
right to remove the case." Now, this being the language of the
various statutes upon the subject, thus precise, thus setting out in
a particular manner every contingency, which must concur in
order to authorize the transfer of a case from the state to the
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federal court, is it to be supposed that Congress intended, in this
act of the 20th of April 1871, by such general language as this
(varying therein, it would be the rule which had always been
adopted in previous legislation) to authorize the transfer? All
these statutes give generally the rights, just as this law gives, and
declare that the courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction ; but they do not, on that account, declare that, in all such
cases, they may be removed from the state to the federal court.
They specify the circumstances which must exist in order to
authorize the removal, and it seems to me the argument is very
strong--so strong that I do not feel inclined to take jurisdiction
of the case, as where they have been specific in every other case
they did not intend by this general language to authorize the
federal courts to remove a case from the state court. What is it
that is claimed? It is not pretended that the right set up here is
within the language of any one of the statutes authorizing the
transfer. As I have said, you must take the ground that, in every
case where the statute gives original jurisdiction, it was the intention that the case might be transferred. This is a right set up
under the authority of the state-a charter created by the state.
True, when the charter is made and the corporation is clothed
with certain rights, then the Constitution of the United States
throws its protecting arm around those rights and declares that
they shall not be jeopardized within certain limits-they shall not
be affected by subsequent legislation of the states; that this charter, for certain purposes, is in the nature of a contract, that
the Constitution protects it as a contract, and that it cannot be
impaired by subsequent legislation. That is the right which is set
up; and it is claimed that if this right is thus set up, where a party
is sued in the state court, the case can be transferred. I have
thought, and f6r the purposes of the motion so held, that the language of the 1st section of the act of April 20th 1871, was express in giving the court original jurisdiction, and that the only
question was whether the fact that it was a corporation deprived
it of the power to come into the federal court. I held that it
did not; that if it was the case of an individual whose rights were
affected he could come into the federal court, and that this company
did not lose that right because it was a corporation. But I am
asked to go further and hold that, in all these cases, wherever there
is original jurisdiction, the case can be transferred; that upon a par-
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ticular showing it must be transferred, because the language of the
various acts of Congress is, whenever the contingencies have occurred provided therein, it shall be the duty of the state court to
proceed' no further in the cause, and it has been held that all acts
subsequently done by the state court are simply void, and that
the parties may disregard and pay no attention to anything done
by the state court. This is the view I take of the question. I
admit it is one of great magnitude. The other question is not
free from difficulty, but I have felt inclined to sustain the jurisdiction in that case. The inclination of my mind is against it in
this case, and I am willing to make an order remanding the case
to the state court, and give the parties, if they so desire, an opportunity of testing the question before the Supreme Court of the
United States, which they will have the right to do at once.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
OFFUTT ET AL. v. SCOTT.
Real estate purchased by a partnership for partnership purposes, and paid for
with partnership funds, as to the creditors of the firm is, in equity, treated as permonal property, and will, if necessary, be subjected to the payment of their debts,
whether the title be conveyed to the partners by name, or to one of them, or to a
third person.
n case of the death of one partner, the survivor is a trustee for all persons interested in the partnership, for the creditors of the firm, for the representatives of
the deceased partner or his heirs, and for himself; and for the purpose of closing
up the business of the firm, he is invested with the exclusive right of possession
and management of the whole partnership property and business. His trust being
to wnd up the concern, his powers are commensurate with the trust ; hence he
may collect, compromise, or otherwise arrange all the debts of the firm, and his
receipts, payments, and doings generally, in that behalf, are valid, if honestly
done, and within the fair scope and purposes of the trust; and until the debts of
the firm are paid, neither the personal representatives nor the heirs of the deceased
partner have any beneficial interest in the partnership property.
When a partnership is dissolved by the death of one partner, the only remedy
at ltw against the firm, by the creditors of the firm, is by suit against the survivor;
and when a creditor has exhausted his remedy at law against the firm, by a suit
against the survivor prosecuted to a return of an execution "no property found,"
he may then file his bill in equity to subject the real estate of the partnership to
the payment of his debt, and this, whether the possession be in the surviving partner, the personal representative, or the heirs of the deceased partner, or any other
person who is not a bond Jide purchaser for valuable consideration and without
notice.
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If goods shipped and consigned to a firm doing a commission business, to be
sold on account of the shipper, are received, but before they are sold one of the
partners dies, the survivor may sell such goods, and, in such case, the claim of
the shipper on account of such sale is properly against the firm, and not against
the survivor individually.
A variance between the statements of the bilt ann tne proof, if not of such V
rharacter as to operate as a surprise to the defendants, and the defendants do not
appear to be thereby injured, should generally be held to be immaterial.
If a surviving partner sell and convey his interest in the real estate belonging
to the partnership to a bond fide purchaser for valuable consideration, without
notice, before a creditor of the firm has acquired a lien on the same by bill filed to
subject it to the payment of his debt, the purchaser will hold it against the general
equity of the creditors to have it appropriated to the payment of the partnership
debts.

from Chancery Court of Montgomery.
The case made by the bill, answers and proof may oe stated as
follows:
In May 1860, and prior thereto, a partnership composed of R.
H. and W. E. Offutt, did business in Montgomery, Alabama, under
the firm name and style of R. H. & W. E. Offutt. In September
1860, the firm was dissolved by the death of W. E., who left R.
H., the surviving partner, one of his executors. During the existence of the partnership, the brothers, who were equal partners,
made a purchase as tenants in common of certain real estate in
Montgomery from one Knox, to whom $9000 of the purchasemoney was due at the death of W. E. After the purchase the
firm used a storehouse on this real estate "as a business stand," in
which they carried on business as grocers and commission merchants. The unpaid balance due for the purchase was paid by R.
H. with partnership assets after the death of W. E., the debt for
this balance being evidenced by "an ordinary negotiable note,
signed R. I. & W. E. Offutt." Before the filing of the bill R.
H. had been removed, and in his stead A. J. Noble appointed
administrator with the will annexed, R. I. having also sold his
interest in the real estate to one Waggoner, from whom Ray purchased under circumstances which it was admitted made him a
bond fide purchaser for value and without notice. A partition of
the real estate had also been made between Ray on the one hand,
and the administrator Noble, and the devisees of Win. E., R. 11.
having surrendered all claim, whether as heir or partner, to the
real estate partitioned to W. E. At the date of the filing of the
iii the real estate was in the possession of Noble as administraAPPEAL
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tor, unencumbered with debt, Noble having received rents, and
was claimed by two of the devisees, the others having assigned
their interest to them.
Scott in April and the early part of May 1860, had shipped in
his own name from Lexington, Kentucky, certain consignments of
bagging, rope and twine, for sale on commission. On May 4th
1860, a small payment had been made on these consignments, and
on January 1st 1861, R. H. gave Scott a note signed in the firm
name for $1045.92 in settlement of part of the consignments, no
account being stated as to the balance. The evidence as to the
time and by whom these shipments were received is fully stated in
the opinion, and need not be here repeated.
The bill alleged that separate shipments were made by Scott
and by Hamilton. The proof, however, showed that the shipments
were all made in Scott's name, but that Hamilton had an undisclosed interest in one of them which was transferred to Scott. It
was urged in this court that this was such a variance between the
allegations and proof as to entitle appellants to a reversal.
Shortly after the note was given the late war commenced, and
as Offutt continued to reside at the South, and Scott and Hamilton resided in Kentucky, they had no further communication about
the matter until they met in New Orleans in February 1866, when
R. H. Offutt took up the original note for $1045.94, giving instead two notes, one to Hamilton and one to Scott, the respective
notes being for their respective interests in the original note. These
notes were given simply in renewal of the original, were signed
"1R. H. & W. E. Offutt," and were not intended by any of the
parties as a release to the firm. Shortly after this R. H. rendered
an account of sales of the consignments not before accounted for,
showing a balance due Scott of $2347.20. R. H., as surviving
partner, had possession of the assets of the firm, and wound up
its business.
In July 1868, Scott having purchased the note given to Hamilton, brought suit on the account and notes heretofore mentioned,
against R. H., in the Circuit Court of Montgomery, recovering
judgipent, on the 1st of February 1870, for 4952.24. Execution was duly issued on this judgment, and returned "no property found." The bill also alleged that R. H. was insolvent.
On the 18th of March 1870 Scott filed his bill, praying that
an account be stated, &c., and that tha real estate mentioned in
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the bill be subjected to and sold for the payment of the amount
found to be due upon the judgment.
R. H. Offutt, Noble the administrator, the four devisees and
heirs at law of William E., and Ray, the purchaser of R. H.'s
interest, were made parties defendant, and answered the bill.
The fespondents objected to the relief prayed for, and set up in
their answer: 1st. That the indebtedness mentioned in the bill, as
shown by the bill itself, occurred after and not before the death
of Win. E. 2d. That the judgment is against R. H. individually,
and not against him as surviving partner of the firm of R. H. &
W. E. Offutt. 3d. That before the filing of the bill R. H. had
sold his interest in the real estate, and that the real estate had
been partitioned between Ray on the one hand, and the heirs and
devisees and administrator of W. E. Offutt on the other, and that
the portion now held by the administrator was assets of the estate
of Win. E., and subject only to payment of the debts of Win. E.,
and belonging to the heirs and devisees of Win. E. 4th. That
the estate of Win. E. is not in any way indebted to complainant,
or liable to pay his demand; that the claim set up was never presented, as required by law, or to any personal representative of
W. E. within eighteen months after grant of letters of administration. 5th. That the claims against the firm were open accounts
at the death of Win. E., and the same were barred by the Statute
of Limitations of three years before the bill was filed, or any proceeding commenced to enforce the same against the estate of
Win. E.
The cause was submitted on bill, answers and proof. The Chancellor decreed in favor of complainant against the real estate in
the hands of the administrator, and dismissed the bill as to respondent Ray. The defendants appealed.
Watts & Troy, for appellants.
-Elmore& Gunter, for appellee.
PE K, C. J.-The first question that seems to arise on this
record is, how is the real estate purchased of Knox and wife
by Richard H. and William E. Offutt to be regarded? Did it
belong to these parties as individuals, as tenants in common, or
did it belong to them as partners, and, therefore, in equity subject
to the payment of the partnership-debts?

OFFUTT ET

AL. V.

SCOTT.

The rule undoubtedly is, that real estate purchased for partnerrhip purposes, and paid for with partnership funds, becomes partnership property, and as far as the creditors of the firm are
concerfied, and for the payment of their debts, it is in equity to
be regarded and treated as belonging to the partnership, as assets
of the firm. It is immaterial to whom the legal title may be conveyed-whether to the partners by name, as individuals, or to one
of them, or to a third person: Parsons on Partnership 364.
In the case of Lang's Heirs v. Waring, 25 Ala. 639, the court
say: "Af t er much vacillation by the English courts, the doctrine
may now, perhaps, be considered as settled, that, unless there is
something in the articles of copartnership, or some agreement by
the parties, real estate purchased with partnership funds, for partnership purposes, is, in a court of equity, converted and treated
as personalSy, and therefore goes to the personal representatives,
and not to the heir of the deceased partner." They further say,
"While the decisions of American courts generally concur in
affirming that such estate is, in equity, chargeable with the debts
of the partnership, and with any balance there may be due from
one partner to another, there is much conflict among them as to
whether the surplus, in case of the death of a partner, shall descend to the heir as real estate, or go to the personal representative for distribution." See also Story on Partnership, § 93.
It is unnecessary for us to resolve the doubt that seems to exist
as to what shall be done in such a case with the surplus that may
remain after the payment of the partnership debts, whether it
shall be regarded as real or personal property. It seems to us,
however, that the better opinion is, that it is to be treated as real
property, and to be disposed of as such.
There is no positive evidence for what purpose this real estate
was purchased, or with what funds it was paid for. The bill states
there was a storehouse on said premises, which, after the purchase,
was occupied by said firm as a business stand; and this is admitted
by the answer of, the respondents. It seems to us, therefore,
the fair inference or presumption is, that this property was purchased for partnership purposes, and, also, that it was paid for out
of the partnership funds. If not, why had the note of tue firm
been given for the $9000 that remained unpaid at the dath of
said W. E. Offutt? The said R. H. Offutt, who was examined as
a witness, says: "The purchase was made partly for cash and
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partly on a credit The last of $9000 remained unpaid at the
time of the death of William E. Offutt, and was subsequently paid
to William Knox, or his order. I do not recollect at what time it
was paid. The claim was an ordinary negotiable note, signed by
R. H. & W. E. Offutt." It does not appear that these parties
had any property outside of the business of the firm, or that did
not belong to the firm.
If this is a correct view of the transaction, as we think it isi
then, on the death of the said W. E. Offutt, in equity it vested,
with all the other partnership property, in the surviving partner,
R. H. Offutt, who thereby became entitled to the exclusive right
of possession and management of the same, but only for the purpose of closing up the partnership business, and paying the partnership debts, &c. In equity he held the property in trust, first.
for the payment of the partnership debts, and then for those who
might be entitled to what remained, whether as heirs or personal
representatives of the deceased partner, or otherwise: Parsons on
Part. 364, 440.
Was the debt of the complainant upon which he recovered his
judgment against the said R. H. Offutt, the debt of said firm of
R. H. & W. E. Offutt, or the individual debt of said R. H. Offutt,
and if the debt of said firm, had the complainant exhausted his
remedy at law against said firm before tle filing of this bill?
1st. The bill states that said debt grew out of shipments of
oagging, rope and twine, made in Lexington, Kentucky, in the
latter part of April and the early part of May 1860, which were
consigned to said firm, in Montgomery, Alabama, to be sold on
account of the shippers; that one R. B. Hamilton made one of
said shipments, and that the other shipments were made by complainant.
The evidence, however, shows they were all made in the name
of the complainant, but that said Hamilton had some interest
therein, which was afterwards assigned to complainant.
These shipments, if they were received by said firm before the
death of said W. E. Offutt, whether sold in whole or in part, or
remaining on hand at the time of his death, constituted a legitimate part of the business of said firm, and, therefore, for the purpose of winding up the business of the firm, might be sold by the
said R. H. Offutt, as surviving partner, and when sold the claim
of the complainant on account thereof was properly against the said
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rm, and not against the survivor as an individual; and being a
Jaim against the firm, it was the duty of the survivor to render
an account of the same to the complainant, and after deducting the
usual commissions, or such as might have been agreed upon between the parties, to have paid the remainder to the complainant.
A surviving partner, in winding up the business of the firm, is a
trustee for all persons interested in the partnership, for the creditors of the firm, for the representatives of the deceased partner, and
for himself; and his trust being to wind up the concern, his powers
are commensurate with the trust, and, generally, whatever he may
do in that behalf is valid, if honestly done, and within the fair
scope and purpose of the trust. If there be negligence, delay, misconduct, or gross mistake, equity will interpose to give the proper
relief: Parsons on Part. 440-443.
In the absence of satisfactory evidence to the contrary, it is to
be presumed these shipments were received within the time then
required to transport such goods from Lexington, Ky., to Montgomery, Ala., in the usual course of trade and of commercial intercourse between these places ; that is, within a reasonable time.
The said R. H. Offutt, in his deposition, says they were received
in the fall; but we think it manifest he uses the word "fall" in
a very loose manner, and without the intention to convey the meaning that they were, in fact, received after the death of his brother.
the said W. B. Offutt, which happened early in September 1860.
after 'said shipments were made. In speaking of the dissolution of said firm by the death of said W. E. Offutt, and when
it ceased to do business, he says it was dissolved by the
death of William E. Offutt, that it ceased to do business in
the fall of 1860; and speaking of the shipment of said goods,
he says, "I recollect the shipment to said firm by said plaintiff; the shipment was received in the fall of 1860." This
evidence certainly does not prove the said goods were received
after the dissolution of said firm by the death of W. E. Offutt.
The time between the date of the last shipment, the 8th day of
May, and the death of said W. E. Oifutt, if it happened on the
1st day of September, thereafter, is 114 days. It seems to us unreasonable to believe, on such evidence, knowing, as we do, the
facilities of transportation between the two places at that time.
that 114 days elapsed between the shipment of said goods and
their arrival at Montgomery. We think it far more reasonable to
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believe they reached their place of destination before the expiration
of half that time; therefore, we feel constrained to believe, and
hold, that said goods were received by said firm before the death
of W. E. Offutt, and that the complainant's debt, arising out of
their sale, whether made before or after the dissolution of the firm,
must be regarded as the debt of said firm, and, therefore, should
be paid out of the assets of the firm.
The character of this indebtedness was not changed, nor the
liability of the firm to pay the same was not released, by the settlement that was had between the said R. H. Offitt, as surviving
partner, the said Hamilton and the complainant, in New Orleans,
in February 1866. The said Hamilton, in his deposition, expressly
states that such was not the intention of himself or of the com)lainant, and the inference is that such was not the intention of
iaid R. H. Offutt, as he then renewed the note that had been given
;o the complainant on the first day of January 1861, for $1045.94,
n the name of the firm, on account, in part, of said goods, and
.hen, or shortly afterwards, rendered to plaintiff an account of sales,
3howing the firm was indebted in the further sum of $2347.20.
2. Had the complainant exhausted his remedy at law against the
firm before the filing of this bill? His only remedy at law against
the firm was by suit against the surviving partner: Parsons on
Part. 447; Hurray v. Mumford, 6 Cowen 441; 1 Oh. P1. 50.
Such suit had been brought, judgment recovered and an execution
on said judgment returned by the sheriff; "no property found."
This was the end of his remedy at law against the firm, and it had
proved unavailing. The only remedy left was in equity, to subject this real estate to the payment of his judgment. Equity,
notwithstanding the form of the conveyance, regards it as the property of the firm, and equity only can appropriate it to the payment of the debts of the firm.
On the part of the respondents, Charles I. Offutt, L. A. R. Switzer, and the administrator de lonis non, &c., it is objected, that
said suit was brought and the judgment rendered against said R.
H. Offutt, not in his character of surviving partner, but as R. 1.
Offutt individually, and that, therefore, said judgment did not in
any way affect the partnership or the partnership property; and
as to said respondents, it proved nothing, except its own existence
as a judgment against R. H. Offutt, but did not prove the complainant had exhausted his remedy at law against said firm. This
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objection cannot prevail. On the death of said W. E. Offutt, the
complainant's only remedy at law against the firm was by suif
against the surviving partner. Such a suit may properly b
brought, against the surviving partner, -without any reference t"
the partnership, or that the defendant is sued as surviving partne(Goelet v. Heh/instry, 1 Johns. Cases 405: 1 Oh. P1. 50); and(
an execution issued on a judgment so recovered may be levied, ncP
only on the individual property of the defendant, but also on the
personal property of the firm; consequently, the complainant's
judgment in this case, and the return of the execution issued on
it "no property found," not only proved the complainant had exhausted his remedy at law against the firm, but that the surviving
partner himself was insolvent. Neither can the objection of the
statutes of non-claim and of limitations, interposed by said respondents, be sustained. The object of the complainant's bill in
this behalf is not to obtain a personal decree, or to enforce a liability against the personal representative of the deceased partner,
but to enforce the trust alleged to exist in favor of the complainant, as a creditor of the said firm, against the real estate of the
partnership, his remedy at law against the firm having been exhausted.
This real estate being a trust fund for the payment of the debts
of the firm, and the complainant a creditor of the firm, with his
remedy at law exhausted, equity will decree the payment of his
debt out of said real estate, whether it be in the possession of the
surviving partner or in the possession of the personal representative or the heirs of the deceased partner. Until the debts of th6
firm are satisfied, neither the personal representative nor the heirs
of the deceased partner have any beneficial interest in the real
estate of the partnership ; but after they are paid, what is left
becomes the property of the surviving partner, and the personal
representatives or heirs of the deceased partner- discharged of the
trust: Parsons on Part. 372, 441, and note p.
The respondent Ray, in his answer, claims that as to the half
interest of the surviving partner, R. H. Offutt, in said real estate,
he is a bond fide purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, and therefore entitled to hold it against the equity of the
complainant, as a creditor of the firm. This, on the hearing, was
conceded by the complainant's counsel, and they admitted that, as
to said half interest, the complainant was entitled to no relief.
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The hill, as to said respondent, was therefore properly dis
missed. As to the remaining half interest, that is, the interest of
the estate of the deceased partner, we see no reason why it should
not be subjected to the payment of the complainant's debt. The
fact that it bad passed into the possession of the deceased partner's
administrator, with the permission of the surviving partner, and
that he and and the respondent, R. H. O0futt, as heirs of the said
W. E. Offutt, had assigned their interest in the same to the
respondents, Charles L. Offutt and A. L. R. Switzer, who are also
heirs of said W. E. Offutt, and that a partition had been made
between said respondent Ray and said Charles L. Offutt and A. L.
R. Switzer and said administrator, it seems to us, cannot defeat the
complainant's equity as a creditor of the firm. As far as appears,
the said assignment was a mere voluntary assignment, without consideration, and as the surviving partner, from whom the said administrator obtained the possession, held it as a trustee for the
creditors of the firm, his possession can stand upon no better equity
than the possession of the person from whom he received it, without paying anything for it. It still remains trust property, and
equity will appropriate it to the purposes of the trust.
As to the alleged variance between the statements of the bill
and the proof, it seems to us said variance is insufficient to prevent
a decree in favor of the complainant. It could hardly have operated as a surprise to the respondents, and we do not see how they
are prejudiced or injured by it, and if not surprised or injured by
it, then it should be regarded as an immaterial variance: Lock'
Ex. v. Palmer,26 Ala. 312 ; Chapman Y. Hamilton, 19 Ala. 121.
The Chancellor decreed that the complainant was entitled to
relief, out of the half interest of said real estate not conveyed to
said respondent Ray, to the extent of one-half of the amount of
the partnership assets of 9000 used by said R. IT. Offutt, after
the death of said W. E. Offutt, in payment for said real estate,
and interest thereon, from the time the administrator, respondent
Noble, commenced receiving the rents and profits of the same.
The reasons of the Chancellor for limiting his decree by the amount
of the assets of the firm paid for said real estate, after the death of
said W. E. Offutt, and subjecting the interest of the estate of the
deceased partner in the same to one-half of that amount only.
with interest thereon from the time the administrator commenced
receiving the rents and profits on said real estate, are not stated in
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the opinion ; whatever his reasons may have been, it seems to us
there is no error in the decree on that account of which the appellants can .complain. The complainant certainly gets no more by
t than he is entitled to.
The decree is affirmed, at the costs of the appellants.

United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin.
ANGELINA AMORY v. SAMUEL B. AMORY ET

AL.

The Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the
executors of a will, which has been admitted to probate by the county court of a
state, from using it to defeat the rights of a citizen of another state.
The decree or judgn ent of a state court can be avoided on the ground of fraud,
both in the courts of the United States and of another state.
The legislature of a state cannot deprive a citizen of another state of his legal
or equitable rights under the Constitution and the laws of Congress, by declaring
in what courts they must be enforced.

THis was a bill in equity, originally filed in the Circuit Court
of Fond du Lac, and transferred thence to the Circuit Court of
the United States, praying for an injunction to restrain the executors of the last will and testament of James Amory from setting
up or using the said will to defeat the legal rights of the complainant.
The judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion as to
whether a demurrer to the bill should be sustained.
Judge MILLER'S opinion has already been published: antep. 38.

I. f.

illett, for complainant.

S. W. Pinney, for defendant.
i)RUMMOND, Circuit J.-On the 16th of August 1861 James
Amory died at Fond du Lac, in this state, possessed of considerable personal and real estate, part of which was in Wisconsin. In
September following, Samuel B. Amory and John Amory, the
brothers of James, presented in the county court of Fond du Lac
county a will, and asked that it be probated. Sometime afterwards the present plaintiff appeared by counsel in that court,
claiming to be the widow and heir of James Amory, and objected
to the probate of the will, and asked for time to show that it was
not the will of James Amory, and should not be probated.
VOL. XXI.-38
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The case was continued from time to time until the 18th of
December, when a further application was made by her for a postponement, but it was refused, and the will was admitted to probate
by the county judge. Thereupon she appealed to the Circuit
Court of the county, and the case went up to that court, and in
the Circuit Court the executors of the will claimed that she had
no right to appeal, on the ground that she had not been the wife
of James Amory, and therefore had no interest in the estate, and
for the purpose of establishing that, they introduced a record from
the state of New York of proceedings in divorce, in which she had
made an application against James Amory for a divorce on various
grounds, and in which it appeared that one of the questions made
in the case was, whether in point of fact she was the wife of James
*Amory, it being alleged that at the time she was married to James
Amory in March 1846, she had a husband living, and the court
found the fact to be so, and for that reason, as it appears, the
divorce was not granted and the bill was dismissed.
This of course, if true, shows that she had no interest in the
property, but that she was a stranger, and had no right to appear
or interfere with the estate of James Amory. She then alleged
that the decree introduced from New York was obtained by trie
fraud of her attorney, and she asked that the question should be
submitted to a jury, whether or not it was a fraudulent decree.
The Circuit Court ordered the issue of fact to be submitted to a
jury, and then refused to dismiss the appeal, denying in othel
words the application of the executors. Thereupon, under the
practice which prevails in this state, the executors took an appeal
from the order of the court refusing to dismiss the appeal to the
Supreme Court of the state. The case remains just as it was with
the application on the part of the plaintiff for a trial by jury,
granted by the court with various affidavits that were filed, and
everything connected with the case as it was; the only question
taken to the Supreme Court being, whether the appeal should
have been dismissed.
The Supreme Court decided that the Circuit Court ought to
have dismissed the appeal on the ground that the record from New
York was conclusive that she never was the wife of James Amory,
and therefore that she had no interest in the estate, and directed
the Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal. The case was then remitted to the Circuit Court, and, in compliance with the order of
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the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court dismissed the appeal.
Shortly after the present plaintiff commenced a suit in the Circuit
Court of Fond du Lac county, and sometime afterwards that suit,
which is this suit, was transferred under the Act of Congress of
1867, before a complaint or any bill was filed, to this court, and
after its transfer to this court the bill was filed, which is now the
subject of demurrer.
Now there may be perhaps a question whether it was competent
for the plaintiff, after the case had been thus dismissed under the
order of the Supreme Court of the state, to make an application
to the Circuit Court to get rid of the will which was thus established. Had she that right on the ground that the decree was
obtained by fraud? I think she had. I do not think that question had become res adjudicata.
Concede that the opinion of the Supreme Court is right, that
the parties there might have tried the question upon the affidavits
instead of an issue by a jury, and that that was a proper practice,
the answer to it is, that it never was tried in that way. The plaintiff never submitted that issue upon affidavits, never asked for the
decree of the court upon that issue upon affidavits, and therefore
she was not precluded from making an application to the state
court to have that issue tried in a proper way.' She did ask.that
it be tried by a jury. Her appeal had been dismissed on the
ground that she had no interest whatever in the subject-matter of
controversy.
Now is it possible that this can be so? Is there no remedy in
such a case? Suppose the case of a woman living in New York,
a man owns an estate in Wisconsin and dies here; a will is presented, made by him as is alleged; it is probated; she comes
forward and claims that she was the wife of the man who is thus
dead. Can it be that without any notice to her, without, it may
be, even her knowing that her husband is dead, she cannot have
an opportunity of determining whether or not this is a will which
divests her of any legal rights which she might possess ? Can it
be that because a will has been probated without her knowledge
she cannot have an opportunity of being heard? How is she to
be heard under the practice in this state? As I understand it,
she can be heard at law only by appeal. If she has no appeal,
can she apply to a court of equity and obtain an order from a
court of equity that this supposed will, if it was not in fact the

AMORY v. AMORY.

will of her deceased husband, shall not be used against her to
prejudice her rights? I certainly do not see why.
Now while that is not the case here, her appeal had been summarily cut off and disposed of by the Supreme Court of the state,
without any trial upon the issue which she tendered. And she
had the right, in my opinion, to present her case on the equity
side of the Circuit Court of this state to prevent these parties who
had that probated will from using it to her prejudice, if in fact it
was not a will. If that is so, she had the right to apply to this
court, and to transfer her cause from a state court to the Circuit
Court of the United States. Otherwise, the supposed safeg'ards
which the Constitution and the laws of the United States have
thrown around the citizens of other states, become in such a case
completely nugatory. That never could have been the intention
of the constitutional provision, and the Acts of Congress upon the
subject.
Again: It is not necessary for us to determine now upon a
demurrer to this bill whether all the relief that is sought for can be
given. If any relief claimed by the plaintiff can be given, the
demurrer should be overruled. This plaintiff claims to be the wife
of James Amory. It appears upon the face of the bill that the
will was set up against her and probated. He had no children.
If he made no will she, if his wife, was his heir under the law of
this state. If he made a will, then the devisees became his heirs.
But he even by his will could not divest her of her rights of dower.
If she was his wife she had a right that existed entirely independent of the will, and with which the probating of the will had
nothing to do. And if his wife, she could come into the courts of
this state and enforce her right of dower. Now if she does that,
what bar is there to such an application ? The bill says that the
bar will be this record from the state of New York, which of itself
would be primd facie sufficient, showing that she never was the
wife of James Amory. But when she alleges that this decree of
the New York court is void, because it was obtained by fraud, and
establishes that fact, then she is entitled to relief independent of
all considerations of the will, so far as her right of dower is concerned, unless indeed, independent of the decree, they show that
she was not the wife of James Amory.
It is enough to say, that I think in the bill there are allegations
sufficient, if sustained, to show that the decree of the court of New
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York was obtained by fraud. The particulars of the fraud are set
forth in the bill. Among other frauds it is alleged that the very
framing of the decree was fraudulently made by a person who
apparently was acting as her attorney, but who was employed and
feed by James Amory himself against her. If that is so, it cannot
be controverted, I think that when she makes an application
in this court or any court of the state for her rights of dower, and
they interpose this decree, she has the right to show that it is of no
effect, so far as the question of marriage is concerned. And if
that is so, it does not affect this question of the probate of the will.
I admit that as a general rule the probate of a will is to be treated
as conclusive, certainly, wherever it comes up collaterally, but I
am not prepared to admit that where a party has been so summarily dismissed from pursuing a remedy which the law furnishesto show that there was no will, and it was improperly probated, is
without any redress by a direct application to a competent court
to prevent the use of that will against the enforcement of all legal
and equitable rights.
A case recently came before the Supreme Court of the United
States upon an application of a distributee against an administrator
for the distribution of an estate, and the objection was taken that
the party must go to the state court, as that was a matter entirely
within the jurisdiction of the probate court, and that an application
could not be made to the Federal court although a party was a
citizen of another state; and the court say such a rule would
deprive the citizens of the several states of some of the rights which
the Constitution and the laws confer on them: Payne v. Hook, 7
Wallace 425. But it is scarcely competent for the legislature
of Wisconsin to deprive a citizen of any other state of his legal or
equitable rights, under the Constitution and laws of Congress, by
declaring that they must be enfo-rced in a local court.
In the Gaines case there was a will of Daniel Clarke, dated in
1811, which was probated in the proper court in Louisiana, and
the executors went on and sold property, and placed the parties in
possession. And Mrs. Gaines claimed under a subsequent will of
1818. She sought to enforce her rights in the Federal courts, and
they held that the probate of the will of 1818 revoked of itself the
will of 1811.
In Gaincs v. Chew, 2 Howard, the Supreme Court intimate
that it was competent for a court of chancery to protect the
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7ights of the plaintiff. It was suggested that those rights ex
isted notwithstanding the probate of the will of 1811, although
the will of 1813 had not been at that time probated.
These defendants in this case are residuary legatees under the
will of James Armory. They claim all the real estate in this state.
The plaintiff, if she is the wife of James Amory, has the right to
come into court to enforce her rights of dower, to say the least.
Now can she not, if she is the wife of James Amory, prevent
these parties from using this decree of the New York court against
her if it is void or of no effect ?
I am not prepared to admit the rule contended for, that it is
indispensable she should go into New York and have the decree
vacated there. I say if it is used here where she seeks to enforce
her rights, that she has the power to get rid of it by showing that
it is fraudulent without going into the state of New York and having it vacated. And when the court of Louisiana admitted to probate the will of Daniel Clarke of 1813, they did it with the express
reservation that any person might attack it by a direct proceeding
whose rights were affected by it, and the Supreme Court of the
United States in adjudicating the case of Gaines v. iennen in
24 Howard 558, stated the same rule as applicable to the
will. They proceeded upon the basis that any person by a direct
proceeding could attack the will of 1818 which had been probated
by a state court. So that taking all the facts together, I am not
prepared to say that the demurrer to this bill should be sustained,
and that there is no equity, and while admitting there may be a
question whether the party should not apply to the Circuit Court
of the state instead of coming here by way of review to have the
appeal set aside so far as relates to the probate of the will, I have
no doubt that the bill can be sustained on the ground that she is
entitled to dower if the decree was obtained by fraud in the state
of New York, and as to a bill of review there possibly might be
difficulty. In the state court her appeal was dismissed. There
was no issue between the parties; the plaintiff never has submitted
the issue or tried the question of fraud upon an issue even upon
affidavits, as I understand the case. And as I said, I think it a
case for the equitable interposition of the court. At any rate I
leave this as a question that might come up hereafter. On the
other point, that of dower, I have no doubt.
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Counsel having asked what was the effect of the disagreement in
the opinion of the court:
Judge DRUMoND.-The law provides, where the judges are
opposed in opinion, the point shall be certified to the Supreme
Court, provided that the case may proceed, if in the opinion of the
court it can be done without prejudice to the merits. My impres
sion is at present that the case had better proceed; the parties can
stand by their demurrer if they choose, and the plaintiff go on and
make the proof, or of course the demurrer can be withdrawn, and
in that case the point could be made by answer, just as well as by
the demurrer, and then the question would come up on the final
hearing.
Judge MiLLER.-I think the bill will have to be dismissed, and
the parties take their appeal.
Judge DRUMMOND.-I will be perfectly willing to certify it up,
provided it can be done, but I am satisfied that it cannot be done.
Judge MILLER.-I do not think it is a case proper to be certified up either. That is my view.
Judge DRUMMOD.-You can examine the authorities, and if it

is found to be a proper case to certify, I am willing to certify it up.1
I The case of a difference'of opinion between the Circuit and District judges,
such as the foregoing, was provided for by the Act of June 1st 1872, Stat. at
Large 1872, p. 196, which directs that the opinion of the Circuit Judge shall prevail. This statute was not published at the time of the foregoing decision, but we
are informed that on the attention of the court being called to it, the demurrer was
overruled in accordance with the foregoing opinion of Judge DRUM-MOND.-ED.
Am. Liw REG.

